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WHAT SHALL THE TRIAL JUDGE TELL THE JURY
ABOUT PRESUMPTIONS?
CE.4RLES T. McCoRmicx
I have been asked to add a comment upon the subject of presumptions, comprehensively dealt with in a recent articlel in this
review. My discussion will be summary and selective, and will be
devoted to certain practical questions suggested by a late decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States, and by some recent
cases in the Supreme Court of Washington. These questions
relate to the manner in which the trial judge shall deal in his
instructions with such presumptions as may have arisen from the
evidence in the case.
In the first place, may not the manifest dangers and difficulties
of charging upon presumptions be entirely avoided by the simple
rule-don't? This is an attractive solution and seems to be advocated as a general practice by Chamberlayne,2 and by more
modern opinions." Thus, Judge Learned Hand recently said: "If
the trial is properly conducted, the presumption will not be mentioned at all." 4 And Mr. Justice Butler doubtless meant the same
thing when, in the late case referred to, 5 he said: "The case
stood for decision by the jury unaffected by the rule" of presumption in the particular case. Nevertheless, I believe that this
practice of keeping silent about the relevant presumptions in a
case, where the issues are disputed and must be submitted to the
jury, runs counter to the traditions of the trial courts in most
states.
It is easy to see how the habit of informing the jury of the presumptions has arisen and continued. Trial judges have to deal
with controversies and with offers of proof which recur in rather
stereotyped forms. The sufficiency of a particular line of proof
*Professor of Law, Northwestern University, School of Law.
1E. M. Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WAsH. L. REv. 255 (Nov., 1937).
23 MIODE RN LAw OF EVIECE, V. 2, § 1085
(1911).
'See, e. g., Cleveland, C., C. and St. L. L Co. v. Wise, 186 Ind. 316,
116 N. E. 299 (1917); McCune v. Daniels, 251 S. W. 458, 461 (Mo. App.,
1923); 64 C. J. 604, n. 45.
'Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 60 F. (2d) 734, 736
(1932).
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Gamer, 58 S. Ct. Adv. Sheets 500,
503 (Feb. 14, 1938).

to go to the jury as circumstantial evidence of a certain fact and
the consequent propriety of explaining to the jury its bearing and
relevancy-this before the trial judge's powers of comment were
curbed-would repeatedly be presented. The recognition of the
reasonableness of the inference crystallizes into a judicial habit,
and the inference hardens into a "presumption". In most judicial
writing, the term "presumption" is applied when a recognized
effect is required to be attached to a recurring group of facts,
whether the judge is merely required to rule that the facts are
sufficient to be submitted to the jury as leading to a particular
inference, or is required to direct the jury that they are compulsive,
i. e., that if they believe the facts proven, they must find the
fact-to-be-inferred. The one standardized practice is just as much
a rule of law as the other.
In the former group, which I have termed permissive presumptions,6 would probably most often be classed the res ipsa loquitur
rule, 7 the presumption of theft from possession of the stolen
goods,8 and the great number of instances where statutes make
certain proof "prima facie evidence" of a particular fact. I
have called the other class mandatory presumptions. Probably
the presumption of death from proof of seven years' disappearance
without being heard from, and the presumption of receipt of a
letter duly addressed and mailed would fall in this group. I say
"probably", for the necessity for making the distinction seldom
arises in practice. The crucial ruling is that the proof is sufficient
to go to the jury, and it rarely becomes important to know
whether the facts if unopposed would require a directed verdict
for the proponent, for the adversary is seldom without an answering shot in his locker. If he gives evidence of rebutting circumstances making against the inference, the compulsive effect, of
course, is gone. If he answers only with testimony contradicting
the existence of the foundation facts, then the trial judge would be
required to instruct the jury that if they find these facts, then
they must find the facts-to-be-inferred. 9 This, again, is rare, so
that the compulsive effect is almost never called into play.
Nevertheless, the last-mentioned possibility does show that a
broadside rule against charging upon presumptions at all is not
'Charges on Presumptions and the Burden of Proof, 5 N. C. L. REv. 291
(1927).
'Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur as a Presumption or a Mere Permissible Inference, 53 A. L. R. 1494.
'See Johnson v. State, 190 Ark. 979, 82 S. W. (2d) 521 (1935);
DECENNIAL DIGESTS, title Larceny, § 77.
'Thus the presumption may operate to change the Issue from that
made by the pleadings, and to that extent may be regarded as having a
"substantive" effect. W. W. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the
Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L. J. 333, 354 (1933).
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feasible. Moreover, it seems that as to some presumptions, the
custom of informing the jury in some fashion of the rule of presumption, is well-nigh universal. Res ipsa loquitur, ° and the
presumption of receipt of a letter from due mailing are instances.
In criminal cases, this is especially true of those presumptions
which look to a general rather than to a specific inference, and
might be called "hortatory" presumptions, such as the presumption
of innocence, the presumption that one intended the consequences
of his acts, and the presumption against one -who suppresses evidence, that it would have made against him. 1 The form books are
replete with instructions on presumptions, 2 and the digests give
abundant evidence of the widespread and unquestioning acceptance of the practice of informing the jury of the presumption
despite the fact that countervailing circumstantial evidence has
been adduced upon the disputed inference.'
In Washington, the
custom seems to be followed by the trial courts and sanctioned
4
in the court of last resort.
It seems to me that the practice is wise and indeed almost necessary.15 In most of our states, the trial judge has lost his common
law power of summing up the testimony orally and informally in
language the jury can understand, and advising them as to the
way of judging the credibility of conflicting witnesses and the
persuasiveness of rival inferences from the facts. Instead, he
must often, as in Washington,' give his charge in writing, and as
a practical matter he must use abstract language, preferably
culled from appellate opinions in past cases, so as to avoid the
"It is held in a leading case that in a res ipsa loquitur situation a
mere general submission to the jury of the issue of negligence, placing
the usual burden of proof on the plaintiff, Is insufficient. The plaintiff
is entitled to instructions which "present the rule in respect to the
prima facie case." Gleeson v. Virginia Midland R. Co., 140 U. S. 435, 444
(1891). The practice of instructing upon the res ipsa Zoquitur rule is
reflected In the cases cited in Note, 53 A. L. R. 1494, DECENNIAL DIGESTS,
title Negiigence, § 138 (2).
uFor numerous Instances of the giving of instructions upon these and
other presumptions in criminal cases, see DECENNIAL DIGESTS, title Gri inal Laws, § 778.
"See for example, the title Presumptions in the indexes of RANDALL,
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES (1922); BRICKWOOD'S SACKETT ON INSTRUCTIONS TO
JuRIEs (3d ed., 1908).
"DECENNIAL DIGESTS,

title Tria7, §§ 205, 234 (7).

"Thus in Goodwin Co. v. Schwaegler, 147 Wash. 547, 549, 266 Pac. 177
(1927) the judgment was reversed for a refusal to instruct on the presumption of receipt of a letter from due mailing. Instructions on presumptions were approved in Steiner v. Royal Blue Cab Co., 172 Wash.
396, 20 P. (2d) 39 (1933) and in Luna v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash.
618, 59 P. (2d) 753 (1936).
1I have given my views In the article cited n. 6, supra. Illuminating
discussions of the question and collections of pertinent cases appear in
E. M. Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of
Proof, 47 HARv. L. REV. 59 (1933) and the scholarly opinion of Dlume, J.
In Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P. (2d) 649, 103 A. L. R. 107 (1935).
"REM. REV. STAT.,

§

339.
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danger that, in fitting the instructions to the particular case, he
may be held to have violated the prohibition against commenting
on the evidence. 17 Instructions upon presumptions, whether permissive or mandatory, since they announce judicial custom crystallized into rules, escape the imputation of being the judge's individual opinion or comment.
They can give the jury substantial aid in avoiding mistakes in
difficult cases. A presumption is a rule which has the effect that
from certain circumstances a certain inference may be drawn.
Persons unaccustomed to weighing evidence and particularly persons of limited intelligence are notoriously suspicious of circumstantial inferences. Such persons, on the other hand, are prone
to be over-credulous of direct testimony. If a party having the
burden of persuasion, then, must rest upon circumstantial evidence
to prove an issuable fact, there is danger that the jury reading
the burden-of-proof charge will mistakenly suppose that the circumstantial inference, especially if countered by direct testimony,
could not be "a preponderance of the evidence." If the counsel
can find a presumption upon which to rely, and can secure a
charge upon it, he can use it in his argument as a basis for an
explanation which may prevent the case from being decided upon
this mistaken notion. Such an argument will be especially effective in states which, like Washington, 8 require the judge to give
his instructions to the jury before the argument.
The needs and demands for instructions which will inform the
jury of a presumption arising on the facts, though the presumption
be faced by circumstantial evidence supporting a contrary inference, are strong enough to guarantee the continuance of the practice in most states, as long as juries continue to sit and judges continue to instruct them. We must face, then, a second and more
difficult question: What is to be the form and purport of such
an instruction? What shall the jury be told about the presumption, and their use of it? I assume that some standard approach,
good for all presumptions except for occasional deviation, should
be sought. To attempt to handle them differently, according to
a classification based upon their varying origins in trial convenience, in experimental probability, in superiority of access of
one party to proof of the fact, or in external considerations of
policy, seems impractical. The ingredients are too mixed for the
trial judge to detect by offhand taste the predominant flavor, or
to admit of agreement to any useful extent, upon a predetermined
grouping founded on this scheme on analysis. 8
nCONST. WASH., Art. IV, § 16.
"See statute cited n. 16, supra.
"9Interesting attempts to classify particular presumptions

according

The baffling nature of the presumption as a tool for the art of
thinking bewilders one who searches for a form of phrasing with
which to present the notion to a jury. In a matter where intuition
and conjecture play so large a part, it is dangerous to be dogmatic, but certain formulas seem likely to be of little use to the
jury. For example, judges have occasionally contented themselves
with a statement in the instructions of the terms of the presumption, without more. This leaves the jury in the air, or implies too
much. 20 The jury, unless a further explanation is made, may suppose that the presumption is a conclusive one, especially if the
judge uses the expression, "the law presumes." Another solution,
formerly more popular than now, is to instruct the jury that the
presumption is "evidence", to be weighed and considered with
the testimony in the case. 21 This avoids the danger that the jury
may infer that the presumption is conclusive, but it probably
means little to the jury, and certainly runs counter to accepted
theories of the nature of evidence. More attractive theoretically,
is the suggestion that the judge instruct the jury that the presumption is to stand accepted, unless they find that the facts upon
which the presumed inference rests are met by evidence of equal
weight, or in other words, unless the contrary evidence leaves their
minds in equipoise, in which event they should decide against the
party having the burden of persuasion upon the issue. 22 It is hard
to phrase such an instruction without conveying the impression
that the presumption itself is "evidence" which must be "met"
or "balanced," '28 The over-riding objection, however, in my mind
is the impression of futility that it conveys. It prescribes a difficult metaphysical task for the jury, which they would only attempt
to perform if they were hesitant and doubtful as to how to proceed,
and having performed it, if the doubt remains, the reward is the
to their origins in policy, experience and convenience may be found in
the opinions of Maltbie, C. J., in O'Dea v. Amadeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170 Atl.
486 (1934) and Maxey, J., in Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co., 315
Pa. 497, 173 Atl. 644 (1934).

2OSee the criticism of such a charge in Garrettson v. Pegg, 64 Ill. 111

(1872). But an instruction merely directing the jury to consider the
presumption against suicide without explaining its effect was thought
sufficient in Radius v. Travelers Ins. Co., 87 F. (2d) 412 (C.C. A. Cal.,
1937).
nSee Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Maddox, 221 Ala. 292, 128 So. 383
(1930) (presumption against suicide); Clark v. Delmars, 102 Vt. 147, 151,
146 Atl. 812 (1929); Notes, Presumptions as Evidence, 95 A. L. R. 878;
Presumption Against Suiciae as Eidence, 103 A. L. R. 185.
"2This form of instruction seems to be adopted in Ohio. Klunk v.
Hocking Valley . Co., 74 Oh. -St. 125, 77 N. E. 752 (1906); Tresise v.
Ashdown, 118 Oh. St. 307, 160 N. E. 898, 58 A. L. R. 1476 (1928).
"Such an instruction was disapproved on this ground in Bollenbach v.
Blumenthal, 341 Ill. 539, 173 N. E. 670, 673 (1930).

instruction to disregard the presumption. It seems to me that it
is more calculated to mystify than to help the average jury.
There are some forms of instruction that might give genuine aid
toward an intelligent consideration of the issue. Usually, where
a presumption is faced with adverse circumstantial evidence, if
there is an issue to go to the jury at all, it is because the facts on
which the presumption rests create a general probability that the
presumed fact exists. The judge might mention these foundation
facts, and point out the general probability of the circumstantial
inference, as one of the factors to be considered by the jury. Thus,
in a recent Federal case, in disapproving a charge on the presumption against suicide, the court said: "Ordinarily, it is not necessary to refer to the presumption against suicide in the charge to
the jury. If the basic fact of death by violence is admitted, or
proved, the presumption arises, and in the absence of countervailing evidence, the judge should direct a verdict for the plaintiff.
If such evidence is produced, the judge should charge the jury in
the usual fashion. He may of course refer in his discretion to the
improbability of suicide as an inference of fact, based on the
common experience of mankind, but the jury should be permitted
to give the inference such weight as it deems best, undisturbed
by the thought that the inference has some sort of artificial pro' 24
It will
bative force which must influence their deliberation.
be observed, however, that in the "usual fashion" of instructing a
jury in the Federal court, the judge is free to follow the common
law tradition of explaining the allowable inferences from the particular circumstantial evidence. As has already been pointed out,
however, the trial judges in most states must tread warily to avoid
an expression of opinion on the facts. In some of these the practice
frowns on any explanation of the allowable circumstantial inferences from particular facts, as being "on the weight of the evidence." 25 Where, however, the judge retains his full common law
powers, or short of that, is authorized to explain the allowable
inferences, this form of instruction may serve most of the useful
purposes of a charge upon the presumption itself.
Most, but perhaps not all. The mind abhors the vacuum of
uncertainty. The trial must end in a verdict, a truth-saying. But
there are many controversies where certainty about the truth is
really impossible. An airplane falls from the sky, a locomotive
crashes into an automobile at midnight, a trawler sinks without a

'Soper, Circ. J., in Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Clemmer,
79 F. (2d) 724, 103 A. L. R. 171, 180 (C. C. A., Va., 1935).
'Pridmore v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 275 Ill.
386, 114 N. E. 176 syl.
6 (1916); Kennedy v. Phillips, 319 Mo. 573, 5 S. W. (2d) 33 syl. 7 (1928);
64 C. J. 527, n. 4.
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trace. Liability hinges upon "fault."
There are no survivors
who witnessed the crucial happenings preceding the disaster.
Still the jury must reach, if possible, a "finding" upon the
"facts."
The principal agency which is provided to enable them
to simulate certainty is the notion of burden of proof in the sense
of burden of persuasion. The judge is to instruct them that if
they are uncertain upon an issue, they nevertheless shall make a
"finding of the facts" against the party having this burden.
This unlucky burden is fixed largely with reference to the rules
regulating the duty of pleading. But the principal object of
pleading is the conveying of fair notice to an adversary of the
scope of one's claim. This secondary effect of apportioning the
risk of uncertainty, when tied strictly to the regulation of pleading,
seems to lead occasionally to unsatisfying results. The general
effect of the pleading rules is to place most of the burden upon
the plaintiff, and as to certain particular groups of facts the result
of this allotment of the burden of persuasion is felt to be harsh
and inexpedient.
Many courts have found escape by the use of presumptions.
The presumption has a closer kinship with the burden of persuasion
than the rules of pleading have. The burden of persuasion is a
fiction by which a feeling of uncertainty may be converted into a
finding of facts. The presumption, as an instrument of reasoningj
is but a mild and ingratiating form of the same fiction.2" The
mind when beset with difficulties does not steam continuously
straight ahead to its goal. It tacks across from point to point. Or
like a swimmer making his way toward a safe and distant shore,
it seeks a reef on which to rest until it may be shown that it can
move on with safety. So in reasoning toward a difficult decision
we are prone to look for some rational hypothesis, some "working
assumption" 2 7 on which we can stand until lured away by the
attraction of a more inviting theory or conclusion. The hypothesis
is not a goal, but a station on the journey. Consequently, the mere
mention of the presumption to the jury, or the instruction as to
the allowable circumstantial inference, without more, leaves us
with an unsatisfied feeling, with a fear that the jury may wish
to know, Where do we go from there ?
Accordingly, the custom has persisted in many states, with surprisingly tough resistance to the criticisms of the text-writers, of
charging the jury as to certain presumptions" having a substantial
backing of probability, that the presumption stands until overcome in the jury's mind by a preponderance of evidence to the
"For an enlightening discussion of the fictional element in presumptions, see L. L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 393 (1930).
"Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U. S. 280, 286 (1935).

In other words, the presumption is a "working"
contrary."8
hypothesis which works by shifting the burden to the party agaihst
whom it operates of satisfying the jury that the presumed inference is untrue. This often gives a more satisfactory apportionment
of the burden of persuasion on a particular issue than can be given
by the general rule that the pleader has the burden. One looks
rather to the ultimate goal, the case or defense as a whole, the
other to a particular fact-problem within the case. Moreover, an
instruction that the presumption stands until the jury are persuaded to the contrary, has the advantage that it seems to make
sense, and so far as we may judge by the other forms thus far
invented of instructions on presumptions by that name, I think
we can say that it is almost the only one that does.
A Washington case at the turn of the century approved in a
suit by a shipper for goods destroyed by the collapse of the steamship company's wharf, an instruction that under these facts a presumption of negligence arose, and that the burden was cast on
the defendant of removing the presumption by a preponderance of
evidence. 2 ° A dozen years later in the course of a long and somewhat confused discussion, in a picturesque death-action involving
not a presumption but a question of the burden of proof of selfdefense, the court said: "A presumption simply changes the order
of proof to the extent that one upon whom it bears must meet or
explain it away. When such explanation is made, the duty is upon
a plaintiff to take up the burden which the law has cast upon him
and sustain the issue by a preponderance of the evidence." 3 0 The
recent case of Steiner v. The Royal Blue Cab Company3l squarely
presented the question. The trial judge instructed "that a presumption of operation by the owner arises when the ownership of
an automobile in a collision is admitted or proven, and that the
burden is then cast upon the defendant to overcome such presumpThe giving
tion by a fair preponderance of all the evidence."
of this charge was assigned as error, and the Supreme Court specifically approved it, and relied on the early case of the steamship
wharf. While the opinion does not always distinguish clearly the
two burdens of going forward with evidence and of persuading
"2See Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 255, 265 (1937); Bohlen,
The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law upon the Burden of Proof,
68 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (1920). A recent English case approving this practice is Winnipeg Electric Co. v. Geel [1932] A. C. 690 (Privy Council).
'Foster v. Pacific Clipper Line, 30 Wash. 515, 71 Pac. 48 (1902). The
opinion can be interpreted, however, as a mere recognition that the defendant having pleaded accident as an affirmative defense assumed the
burden of persuasion.
"oWelch v. Creech, 88 Wash. 429, 153 Pac. 355, L. R. A. 1918 A 353
(1915).
3172 Wash. 396, 20 P. (2d) 39 (1933).
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the jury, in upshot it seems a clear sanctioning of the instruction
which gives to the presumption the effect of shifting the latter
burden.
A recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of New York Life Insurance Company v.
GarnerS2 definitely disapproves this practice and restates the position of Thayer and Wigmore that the presumption "ceases upon
the introduction of substantial proof to the contrary." The action
was upon a life policy, with provision for double indemnity for
accidental death, containing the clause, "double indemnity shall
not be payable if the insured's death resulted from self-destruction." The complaint charged accidental death and that death
did not result from suicide. The answer denied accident, and "as
an affirmative defense" alleged suicide. The insured died from
a pistol shot through the heart and the circumstances proved were
such that the jury might reasonably have found for or against
suicide. The trial judge, relying upon an earlier pronouncement
of the Suprenme Court approving a similar charge on the same
issue, instructed: "The presumption of law is that the death was not
voluntary, and the defendant... must overcome this presumption
and satisfy the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that his
death was voluntary."
Verdict and judgment followed for the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Butler, distinguished the earlier decision on somewhat tenuous
grounds, and reversed the judgment for error in this instruction.
The opinion is quite unsatisfying in its failure to deal with the
body of recent scholarly opinion"3 which supports the practice followed by the trial court. 4 The Washington court handles the problem of burden of persuasion in this type of cases by a different
method, which might well have been open to the court in the Federal case. It holds that where the policy excepts suicide from the
risk assumed, the defendant must plead suicide as an affirmative
258 S. Ct. Adv. Sheets 500 (1938).
"'Particularly the articles by Morgan, cited n. 28, supra, and Bohlen,
n. 28, supra. Other recent opinions on the same question, which reach
the same conclusion as the Gamer case, but which treat the problem far
more adequately, are the Watkins case, supra, n. 19, and the Clemmer
case, supra, n. 24.
"Nor does Mr. Justice Black's dissent give any adequate discussion of
the merits of the question whether the jury should be instructed that
the burden shifts. He does raise the interesting question, ignored by the
majority, whether the Federal court in Montana was required to follow
the Montana rule as to this. His further objection, that the majority
opinion trenches upon jury functions in conceding to the trial judge the
power to determine, after the presumption against suicide has been
answered 'by evidence, whether there is substantial conflict to be submitted to the jury, seems 'baseless. This Is one of the familiar common
law powers of the judge.
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defense, and consequently carries the burden of persuasion as
upon other such defences. 5
Professor Morgan argues persuasively for endowing the presumption with the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion,
but suggests that this may best be done by the charge on the burden
of proof, without mentioning the presumption to the jury at allA6
As I have indicated earlier in this paper, I am inclined to think
that it is a more natural practice, especially under the American
tied-judge system, to mention the presumption, so that the jury
may appreciate the legal recognition of a slant of policy or probability as the reason for placing on the party this particular burden. If this is true when the presumption operates (as it usually
would) in favor of the plaintiff, who has the general burden of
proof, so that the presumption would result in an issue being
singled out and the burden thereon placed on the defendant, much
more is it true (as Mr. Justice Blume points out in the passage
quoted by Professor Morgan SSa) when the presumption operates
in favor of the defendant. In such case the presumption would not
affect the instructions at all, but would be swallowed up in the
larger instruction that the plaintiff has the burden on everything
that he has pleaded. This smothers any hint of the recognized
policy or probabilities behind the particular presumption.
A final situation brings into sharpest focus the problem of the
value of the presumption as a guide for decision by judge or jury.
We have said that in cases where the fact at issue is really unascertainable, the presumption serves to translate uncertainty into
decision, namely, into the finding favored by policy or a priori
probability. Let us suppose that a party proves circumstances
which ground an inference and a presumption of a fact-in-issue.
He proves due mailing of a letter, properly addressed, bearing a
return address, and that it was never returned. Not only does
this create a technical, legal presumption, conclusive if contrary
evidence is not adduced, that the letter was duly delivered to the
addressee, but if the evidence is believed, it creates a probability
which measured by experience makes the odds overwhelming in
favor of due delivery. We may certainly assume that the class
of letters, of which all we know is that they have been duly mailed,
correctly addressed and not returned, will have been duly delivered in the ratio of one thousand delivered to one miscarried. But
'sSelover v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 180 Wash. 236, 38 P. (2d) 1059
(1934) (disapproving instruction placing burden of persuasion upon
plaintiff, and holding erroneous also an instruction that the presumption
against suicide disappears when any competent evidence to the contrary
is adduced).
"12 WASH. L. REV. 281.
3a12 WASH. L. REv. 273.
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suppose this is not all we know. Suppose the addressee takes the
stand and testifies unequivocally that he did not receive the letter.
Here we have traveled outside the range of familiar current experience. We cannot generalize with confidence upon the odds
against miscarriage in the group defined as cases where the sender
swears to due mailing and addressing and no return, and the addressee swears to non-delivery. On the one hand, the addressee
may be lying or mistaken about delivery. On the other, the sender
may be lying or mistaken about the mailing; or the postal service,
by remote chance, may have miscarried. The latter possibility
still seems a minor factor in the equation. The testimony of the
addressee that he did not receive the letter is not disputed, we
assume, by any direct testimony of anyone who asserts that he did
receive it. Is it for this reason to be accepted as conclusive
by all reasonable men, and must the judge accordingly direct the
jury to find, contrary to the presumption, that the letter was not
received? Despite some early cases when mails were less regular,
and others where the balancing factors were not recognized, the
answer today is clear. The issue is for the jury. 7 But the need
here is most imperative for an instruction upon the presumption,
preferably one which explains the presumption, and the probabilities on which it rests, and advises the jury that the addressee's
testimony, though not directly contradicted, is not conclusive.
In another situation, now frequently recurrent, the circumstantial inference behind the presumption, and the direct testimony,
meet head-on. The plaintiff sues for injury caused by an automobile. To establish the defendant's responsibility, the plaintiff
proves that the automobile was owned by the defendant, and that
at the time of the injury, it was driven by an employee of the defendant. These facts are usually not controverted. They raise a
presumption, and an inference from experience, that at the time
of the accident, the car was being used in the course of the owner's
business. But the defendant and the driver testify that the driver
at the particular moment was using the car against orders and
upon a private errand. If there is no direct contradiction, and
no evidence of other circumstances bearing on the probable truth
of the stories of the owner and driver, should the issue go to the
jury? It would seem so. True; the regularity of chauffeurs in
sticking to business is much less invariable than the regularity of
the mails. The chances of deviation are greater, but even so, the
odds are very heavy on regularity. Moreover, the foundation-facts
3'American Surety Co. v. Blake, 54 Idaho 1, 27 P. (2d) 972, 91 A. L. R.
153, 164 (1933). The earlier Washington cases were to the contrary, 'but
the present holding Is in accord. Goodwin Co. v. Schwaegler, 147 Wash.
547, 266 Pac. 177 (1928); 91 A. L. R. at 157.
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of ownership and employment (unlike the letter-mailing) are
easily checked, and usually admitted. In addition, the situation
would be pregnant with temptation to safe and successful perjury
if there were a rule that the owner's and driver's testimony, though
against the grain of experience as evidenced by the presumption,
must be believed. Probably no court would assert such a rule.
The California statute38 providing that a jury is not required to
believe direct testimony against a legal presumption, may support
the opposite rule, that in such cases the jury must always be given
the liberty to decide against the testimony and for the presumption.
The later Washington cases89 seem to announce an intermediate
rule that the presumption is not "met", "overcome"
or "rebutted" by direct testimony denying the presumed fact, where
the testimony is from witnesses who are "interested "-and an
employee is classed as "interested" 40-- or by evidence which is
4
merely circumstantial. 1
It seems arguable, however, that the solution should not be
sought in terms of a mechanical "rule" about the character of
evidence which will "overcome"
a presumption. Actually the
case seldom stands starkly as one of presumption versus direct
testimony. In the presumption from ownership and employment,
there are nearly always circumstances such as place and time of
accident, persons accompanying the driver, or contents of the
vehicle, which will confirm or shake the credibility of the story.
Moreover, the statement of a rule naturally leads to its application to other presumptions, where the backing of probability is
much slighter,' and where the rule is calculated to send eases
automatically to a jury where the trial judge's control is needed.
With deference it is submitted that all these controversies, with
their infinite variety of factors beyond the mere elements of presumption and direct testimony, should be left, as the question of
directing a verdict is usually left, for individualized handling by

§ 2061, subdivision 2 (Deering's ed., 1937).
'Steiner v. Royal Blue Cab Co., 172 Wash. 396, 20 P. (2d) 39 (1933);
McMullen v. Warren Motor Co., 174 Wash. 454, 25 P. (2d) 99 (1933);
T.emplin v. Doan, 187 Wash. 68, 59 P. (2d) 1110 (1936).
4°Steiner v. Royal Blue Cab Co., n. 39, supra. See the criticism of this
result, in which it Is pointed out that in these cases the defendant's witnesses will practically always be "interested", under this test. Paul M.
Goode, Presumptions Arising from Oumership of a Vehicle, 8 WASH. L.
REv. 137, 139 (1934).
It has been suggested that the emphasis upon
interest here Is a relic of the common law disqualification of interested
persons. Denton v. Carroll, 4 App. D. 532, 40 N. Y. S. 19 (1896).
"Reinhart v. Ore.-Wash. R. & N. Co., 174 Wash. 320, 24 P. (2d) 615
(1933).
OThus the problem has arisen, for example, In connection with the
following presumptions (in addition to those of receipt from due mailing,
and liability from ownership of a vehicle) which I should rank in a
3CODE CIv. PRoc.
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the trial judge in the exercise of his trained and responsible judgment. 48 The problem will then be seen as one of assessing all the
evidence and inferences, including the inference behind the presumption, and including the discounting effect of any interest
which a witness may have, to determine whether minds could
reasonably differ as to the conclusion to be reached.

descending scale as to strength of prolabilities. Payment of premium,
from delivery of policy to insured. Beggs v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 219 Iowa 24, 257 N. W. 445, 95 A. L. R 863 (1934) (for jury). Presumption in death-action of due care of deceased. Reinbart v. Ore.-Wash.
R. & N. Co., n. 41, supra (for jury). Presumption of sanity of accused
in criminal case, Commonwealth v. Clark, 198 N. E. 641 (Mass., 1935)
(for jury). Statutory presumption that statement secured from injured
person within thirty days after injury was fraudulently procured. Cosgrove v. McConagle, 196 Minn. 6, 264 N. W. 134 (1935) (presumption
created no issue for jury, in face of undisputed contrary credible evidence).
Presumption that plaintiff in. libel suit bore good reputation.
Luna v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618, 59 P. (2d) 753, 105 A. L. R.
932 (1936) (for jury).
"Convincing expositions of this view are found in the opinions of
Campbell, J., in Jelke v. Delmont State Bank, 54 S. D. 446, 223 N. W. 585,
72 A. L. R. 7 (1929); and Belt, 3., in Miller v. Service and Sales, Inc.,
149 Ore. 11, 38 P. (2d) 995 (1934). See Nbtes, Right to Direct a Verdict
on Testimony of Interested Witness, 72 A. L. R. 27; CJonelusiveness of
Uncontradicted Testimonil of Interested Witness Where Opposed to Presumption, 72 A. L. R. 94.

